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Open, distributed and user-centered:  
Towards a paradigm shift in innovation policy 
 
Abstract 
Today's innovation policies ignore that innovation is increasingly open, distributed and 
user-centered.  The  dominant  logic  in  policymaking  is  one  of  producer-centered 
innovation. Commercial enterprises and public research organizations are supposed to be 
hampered  by  market  failures  (including  problems  with  appropriation,  uncertainty, 
indivisibility and asymmetric information) and accordingly need interventions like R&D 
tax credits, grant schemes, public research funding and support for collaboration in order 
to innovate more and better. In this paper we introduce the user-centered model as an 
alternative  paradigm  of  how  innovation  'works'.  We  discuss  how  it  differs  from 
traditional, linear producer-centered model, argue why it is legitimate to develop policies 
in  support  of  it,  and  provide  specific  directions.  In  general,  we  conclude  that  user 
innovation policies are legitimate because they are marked by voluntary spillovers, but 
hampered  by  some  specific  system  and  market  failures.  Two  general  principles  for 
policymaking are to not confuse user innovation with 'user-driven' innovation – which is 
producer-centered innovation in disguise – and to accept that except for organizations, 
individuals should be eligible for policy interventions too. After adopting these giant 
leaps,  specific  directions  for  policymaking  include  to  1.  Stimulate  networking  and 
collaboration between users, 2. Facilitate the adoption of user innovations by producers, 3. 
Facilitate  modular  designs  of  innovations,  4.  Improve  individuals'  technical  skills,  5. 
Rethink intellectual property rights, 6. Explore a next generation of financial incentives 
and 7. Improve the measurement of user innovation in official statistics.  
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1. Introduction  
Today, around the world innovation policies are offered to support organizations in their 
innovation-related  efforts.  Prominent  examples  include  subsidies  for  research  and 
development expenditures of private firms, and intellectual property law protections to 
increase the profits of those who introduce innovations into the marketplace. A recent 
inventory  of  policies  in  OECD  countries  demonstrated  that  all  developed  countries 
engage in innovation policy development, and moreover, that the scope of innovation 
policy is still increasing. In 2008, governments of the EU Member States offered no less 
than 1157 policy measures (Tsipouri et al., 2008). The main justification for these efforts 
is  that  the  social  return  on  innovation  exceeds  the  private  benefits  of  its  direct 
beneficiaries. This is because of spillovers, implying that knowledge developed by one 
actor  eventually  becomes  available  to  others,  that  technologies  developed  in  separate 
contexts can be complementary, and that price-quality ratios for customers become better 
(Griliches, 1992; Jaffe, 1996). The existence of spillovers includes that other actors also 
benefit from enterprises' innovative efforts, and that more innovation results in a better 
economic performance and increased social welfare.  
  Policymakers' incumbent view of how innovations come to life is based on  a 
producer-centered  model.  It  is  assumed  that  economically  important  innovations  are 
developed  by  producers,  and  that  these  producers  need  to  be  able  to  protect  their 
innovations by intellectual property rights in order to secure monopolies over them for 
some period of time (Arrow, 1962). The common thought is that actors innovate to gain 
direct  economic  advantage  because  of  increased  sales,  customer  retention,  decreased 
costs  or  better  quality  as  a  consequence  of  product  and/or  process  innovation.  For 
example,  the  INNO-Policy  TrendChart  which  lists  the  main  innovation  policy 
instruments offered in developed countries, defines innovation policy measures as those 
interventions  'where  the  target  group  (final  beneficiaries)  or  organization  eligible  for 
funding or support are enterprises' (Tsipouri et al., 2008: p.13). In this vein, the linear 
model of innovation, despite being criticized extensively in the academic world, is still 
alive and kicking today (Godin, 2006).  
  An  emerging  and  growing  line  of  research  shows  that  the  producer-centered 
innovation model is often not correct. Evidence has been rapidly growing that users, 
rather than producers, frequently create and modify products to serve their own needs. 
Users can be either firms or individual end consumers that expect to benefit from using 
an innovative product. In contrast, producers expect to benefit from selling an innovative 
product (von Hippel, 2005). A firm or an individual can have different relationships to 
different innovations. For example, Boeing is a producer of airplanes, but it is also a user 
of  machine  tools.  If  one  were  examining  innovations  developed  by  Boeing  for  the 
airplanes it sells, Boeing would be a producer-innovator in those cases. But if one were 
considering innovations in metal-forming machinery developed by Boeing for in-house 
use in building airplanes, those would be categorized as user innovations and Boeing 
would be a user-innovator in those cases. Empirical studies have found that many of the 
successful products put on the market by producers were actually first developed by users 
– for example, in scientific instruments, sports equipment, ICT and medical applications. 
In addition, innovating users have been shown to often not take advantage of available   6 
intellectual property protections or innovation subsidies. They often revealed what they 
have developed to each other and to producers without charge (von Hippel, 2005).  
  From the perspective of the producer-centered model, innovation by users may 
leave policymakers with feelings of discomfort. A very prominent example is the many 
open-source  software  projects  found  today.  Open-source  software  is  developed  by 
communities  of  volunteers  who  coordinate  their  activities  through  the  Internet.  Such 
projects induce very powerful innovations with great social benefits, but for policymakers 
it is uncertain if and how such innovations need to be supported. Although open-source 
projects  show  that  user  innovation  can  be  as  (or  even  more)  effective  than  software 
innovations  by  producers,  such  projects  are  certainly  not  eligible  for  the  bulk  of  the 
current policy interventions.  
  This  paper  explores  the  policy  implications  of  the  user-centered  model  of 
innovation. We first contrast the user-centered model of innovation with the traditional, 
producer-oriented view of how innovation happens. In section 2 we discuss both models 
of innovation. Their differences will be elaborated on, and empirical evidence will be 
discussed to show that user innovation is a widespread among firms and individual end 
consumers. Next, section 3 explains the legitimacy of policies for user innovation. It is 
shown that innovation by users is marked by significant spillovers which enhance social 
welfare, but user innovation is also hampered by specific market and system failures, 
preventing  the  model  to  grow  to  its  full  potential.  Section  4  then  elaborates  on  the 
consequences of user innovation for policy. Two general principles for policymaking are 
discussed  first.  The  user-centered  model  should  not  be  confused  with  'user-driven' 
innovation (which is nothing more than a specific form of producer-centered innovation). 
Another principle is that access to policy interventions should also be open to individuals, 
not  just  organizations.  Next,  we  provide  some  directions  to  achieve  more  neutral 
innovation policies including to 1. Stimulate networking and collaboration between users, 
2. Facilitate the adoption of user innovations by producers, 3. Facilitate modular designs 
of innovations, 4. Improve individuals' technical skills, 5. Rethink intellectual property 
rights,  6.  Introduce  a  next  generation  of  financial  incentives  and  7.  Improve  the 
measurement of innovation in official statistics. Section 5 then further discusses our ideas 
and proposes an agenda for future research. We conclude that social welfare will benefit 
from a policy mix which is less biased towards the producer-oriented model, and that 
policies to account for the emerging user-centered model are merited.  
2. An alternative paradigm  
This section first describes the producer-oriented, linear model of innovation. Next, we 
discuss  what  user  innovation  is  about  and  how  it  differs  from  producer-oriented 
innovation. The section proceeds with an overview of empirical evidence to denote that 
user innovation is not an incidental phenomenon, and ends with an overview of the user-
centered model that is marked by openness and distribution of innovative behavior across 
many individuals. 
2.1 Producer-centered model 
The dominant logic in today's policymaking is one of producer-centered innovation. It is 
assumed that most important innovations originate from producers and be supplied to   7 
consumers via  goods that  were  for sale. This  view  stems  from the  traditional,  linear 
model of innovation postulating that innovation starts with basic research. Results with 
commercial potential then move to applied research and to development of new products 
and processes. Production and diffusion then follow (Figure 1).  
 
Figure 1. Producer-centered, linear model of innovation 
Basic research Applied research Development Production Diffusion
 
 
First versions of the linear model were proposed at the beginning of the twentieth century, 
but  broad  application  only  took  off  with  the  emergence  of  the  large  multinational 
organizations  who  organized  their  innovation  processes  in  large  R&D  departments 
(Godin, 2006). Since the fifties, the model was subsequently adopted by policy makers 
and statistical offices (OECD, 1962), and scientists in economics (e.g. Nelson, 1959) and 
management  (e.g.  Myers  and  Marquis,  1969).  In  fact,  the  linear  model  became  an 
'entrenched  fact  of  life'  since  statistical  indicators  based  on  the  linear  model  were 
developed and broadly adopted in the 1960s (e.g. NSF, 1953; OECD, 1962). The Frascati 
Manual (OECD, 2002), drawing heavily on the linear model, became a standard practice 
for conducting R&D surveys and for producing statistical indicators for policy targets, 
and for this reason, rival models could never easily become substitutes (Godin, 2006).  
  Public innovation policies drawing on the linear model basically argue that basic 
and  applied  research  induce  innovation  and  diffusion,  which  in  turn  results  in 
productivity gains and economic growth. It is also argued that private investments in 
research  will  be  too  scant,  because  of  knowledge  spillovers  and  the  ability  of  other 
economic  agents  to  'free  ride'  on  innovation  investments.  Market  failures,  including 
insufficient  opportunities  to  appropriate  research  output  and  the  uncertainty  and 
indivisibility of many innovations, bring about that private parties will under-invest in 
innovation (Nelson, 1959; Arrow, 1962). As a consequence, it is considered legitimate to 
offer policies to subsidize research and development and to offer intellectual property 
rights (Teece, 1986).  
  Scientists  have  extensively  criticized  the  linear  model,  a  process  that  actually 
started in the early years of its existence. There has been a demand-pull version of the 
model, arguing that innovation was driven by the perceived demand of potential users – 
research  would  develop  products  in  efforts  to  respond  to  customer  problems  or 
suggestions  (Rothwell,  1992).  Other  major  concerns  were  the  assumed  linearity  of 
innovation,  i.e.  relationships  between  science,  development,  production  and  diffusion 
have  been  proposed  to  be  complex  and  interrelated  (e.g.  Price,  1965;  Kline,  1985; 
Rothwell, 1992). It has also been suggested that successful innovators utilize multiple 
sources of innovation, including in-house R&D and linkages to customers, competitors 
and other network partners (Freeman, 1991). Besides, some have stressed the informal 
way  of  innovation.  The  linear  model  corresponds  with  a  science,  technology  and 
innovation (STI) mode of innovation, and is based on the production and use of codified 
scientific and technological knowledge. Alternatively, there is a proposed doing, using 
and  interacting  (DUI)  mode  which  relies  on  informal  processes  of  learning  and 
experience-based  know-how  (Jensen  et  al.,  2007).  Although  such  critics  are  widely   8 
shared,  all  proposed  models  regard  producers  as  key  actors  in  innovation,  and 
accordingly today's innovation policies are still drawing heavily on the producer-centered, 
linear  model.  Policy  interventions  generally  deal  with  firms'  R&D  expenditures, 
collaborations  with  universities,  public  investments  in  scientific  research,  and  the 
valorization of basic knowledge.  
  The  producer-centered  model  seems  reasonable  on  the  face  of  it  –  producers 
generally serve many users and so can profit from multiple copies of a single innovative 
design.  Individual  users  in  contrast,  depend  upon  benefits  from  in-house  use  of  an 
innovation to recoup any investment in innovation. Presumably, therefore, a producer 
who serves many customers can afford to invest more in innovation than any single user. 
From  this  it follows  logically  that producer-developed  designs  should dominate user-
developed  designs  in most  parts  of  the  economy.  However,  we  argue  that  in  current 
policies an 'innovation gap' is present between the types of innovation that matter most to 
businesses  and  the  established  policy  interventions  that  are  intended  to  promote 
innovation.  
2.2 User innovation 
As mentioned in the introduction section, user innovators can either firms or individual 
consumers that expect to benefit from using an innovative product. In contrast, producer 
innovators expect to benefit from selling an innovative product. Firm or individuals can 
be  both  producer-  or  user  innovators  in  specific  situations.  For  example,  Sony  is  a 
producer of electronic equipment, but it is also a user of machine tools. With respect to 
the innovations that it develops for its electronic products, it is a producer innovator, but 
if  we  would  investigate  innovations  in  its  machinery  or  production  processes,  the 
company  could  qualify  as  a  user  innovator.  Both  types  represent  the  two  general 
'functional' relationships between innovator and innovation. Users are unique in that they 
alone  benefit  directly  from  innovations.  All  others  (here  lumped  under  the  term 
'producers') must sell innovation-related products to users, indirectly or directly, in order 
to profit from innovations. Thus, in order to profit, producer inventors must sell or license 
knowledge  related  to  innovations,  and  producer  manufacturers  must  sell  products  or 
services incorporating innovations.  
  The distinction how producers and users benefit from innovation is the main and 
exclusive  difference  between  both  types.  Some  more  distinguishing  features  are 
presented in Table 1 (derived from von Hippel, 2005). In advance, we remark that except 
for the top row these are not exclusive features of either producer or user innovation, but 
rather should be regarded as extremes on a continuum.  
 
Table 1. Features of producer and user innovators 
  Producer innovator  User innovator 
Benefit from innovation  by selling  by using 
Motive to innovate  opportunity  necessity 
Type of actor  mainly organizations (enterprises, 
PROs, self-employed) 
many individuals, also 
including end consumers 
Type of knowledge  solution information  need information 
Type of innovation  Improving quality, reliability, design  Bringing functional novelty 
Phase in industry life cycle  Incumbent/mature phases  Nascent and emerging phases 
Diffusion mechanisms  sales, licensing, involuntary spillovers  voluntary spillovers   9 
 
User-innovators tend to be triggered by different motives than producers. They tend to 
innovate if they want something that is not available on the market, and are able and 
willing to invest in its development – necessity is what drives them. In practice, many 
users  do  not  find  precisely  what  they  need  on  incumbent  markets.  Meta-analyses  of 
market-segmentation  studies  suggest  that  user  needs  for  products  are  highly 
heterogeneous  in  many  fields  (Franke  &  Reisinger,  2003).  Producers  tend  to  follow 
product development strategies to meet the needs of homogenous market segments. They 
are motivated by perceived opportunities to serve sufficiently large numbers of customers 
(users) to justify their innovation investments. This strategy of 'few sizes fit all' however 
leaves many users dissatisfied with commercial products on offer. As a consequence, 
some of them will modify their products or have a high willingness to spend time and 
money to develop a 'home built' version of a product that exactly satisfies their needs 
(von Hippel, 2005). 
  Producers and users tend to be different types of actors. Producers are typically 
organizations, including commercial enterprises, knowledge institutes such as universities 
and public research organizations, or self-employed inventors aiming to make  money 
from their ideas. On the other hand, a user innovator may be any person facing a specific 
need that cannot be met by incumbent market offerings. The user model more dominantly 
recognizes individuals as potential innovators. They may very well be commercial firms 
developing  equipment  or  processes  for  in  house  use,  but  also  hobbyists  such  as 
contributors to open-source projects or end consumers in sports communities.  
  Users  and  producers  tend  to  know  different  things  and  accordingly  employ 
different  knowledge in the innovation process.  Users have the advantage of knowing 
precisely what they want, i.e. they possess superior need information. Producers need to 
rely on market research to get a glimpse of unsatisfied user needs, but in practice, this is 
difficult. Estimates of failed product innovations range from 75 to 90 percent of all new 
product introductions (Cooper, 2003). User innovators possess 'sticky information' about 
their needs - information that is costly to transfer from one individual to another because 
of differences in background knowledge, experience, and context of use information (von 
Hippel, 1994). Transferring this information to producers is expensive and tends to make 
user innovation more efficient than attempting to teach producers on user needs. A study 
of innovations in mountain biking equipment, for example, found that user innovations 
often depended on information that the inventors had obtained through their own cycling 
experience, reflecting their own unique circumstances and interests, such as a desire to 
bike in extreme weather conditions or to perform acrobatic stunts (von Hippel, 2005). 
Producers, on the other hand, possess better capabilities to design and market innovations, 
i.e. they employ specialized engineers, have professional software and machines, and an 
infrastructure to develop and market innovations for larger numbers of users. In sum, 
producers are advanced in terms of solution information, while users are advanced in 
terms of need information. 
  This distinct knowledge has direct implications for the types of innovations that 
producers and users develop. Due to information stickiness, innovators tend to rely on 
information they already have in stock (von Hippel, 1994). Users are more likely to come 
up with functionally novel innovations, requiring a great deal of user-need information 
and use-context information for their development. In contrast, producers tend to produce   10 
incremental innovations that are improvements on well-known needs and that require a 
rich  understanding  of  solution  information  for  their  development,  including  design, 
reliability and technical quality. Their innovations tend to look more 'professional' and 
'sustainable', while user innovations on average seem like amateur jobs but with superior 
new functionality.  In this context, Riggs and von Hippel (1994) studied the types of 
innovations made by users and producers that improved the functioning of two major 
types of scientific instruments. They found that users are significantly more likely than 
producers to develop innovations that enabled the instruments to do qualitatively new 
things for the first time. In contrast, producers developed innovations that enabled users 
to do the same things they had been doing, but to do them more conveniently or reliably. 
  Another distinction is that user innovators are most significant in the early stages 
of industry emergence, while producers tend to enter only later when sufficient numbers 
of users can be identified with homogenous needs. User innovators tend to active in the 
nascent and emerging phases of the industry life cycle. Studies of innovating users (both 
individuals and firms) show them to have the characteristics of 'lead users'. That is, they 
are ahead of the majority of users in their populations with respect to an important market 
trend, and they expect to gain relatively high benefits from a solution to the needs they 
have  encountered  there.  It  has  been  demonstrated  that  many  of  the  novel  products 
developed by users for their own use are appealing to other users, and some of these 
provide the basis for products that commercial producers commercialize (Lilien et al., 
2002). A typical pattern is that users initially only innovate for themselves – they may do 
this  solo  or  in  collaboration  with  other  users  (e.g.  open-source  projects).  Next,  user 
innovators  may  face  requests  from  other  users  willing  to  adopt  their  products.  They 
sometimes decide to start their own business to commercialize their innovations, and 
become  producers  on  second  thought  (Shah  &  Tripsas,  2007).  As  this  stage  policy 
makers may recognize that a new industry emerges which may start to show up in official 
statistics. Incumbent producers typically enter at this stage. They may feel attracted by 
the  opportunity  of  serving  larger  numbers  of  users  with  improved  versions  of  user 
innovations.  
  A final, important distinction is that producer and user innovators differ in how 
they  see  their  innovations  diffuse  to  other  actors.  As  indicated,  producers  expect  to 
benefit from their innovations by selling them to users, or alternatively, by selling or 
licensing  their  innovative  knowledge  to  other  producers  who  might  do  the  job  of 
commercialization.  Other  actors  may  also  benefit  from  producer  innovations  via 
spillovers, but producers consider these undesirable and at the expense of their hard work 
– so governments introduced intellectual property rights in order not to deprive producers 
from engaging in innovation. In contradiction, user often achieve widespread diffusion by 
just revealing what they have developed (Harhoff et al., 2003). This may seem strange, 
but it is often the best or the only practical option available to users, as hiding innovations 
with trade secrets is unlikely to be effective for long and user innovators do not care too 
much about direct economic benefits anyway
4.  
                                                 
4 The case user innovators deciding to start a business to commercialize their innovations (e.g. Shah & 
Tripsas, 2007) is an exception to this rule of thumb,    11 
2.3 Frequency of user innovation 
Many of those who hear about user innovation for the first time regard it as a rare and 
insignificant phenomenon. In the past decade however, empirical evidence has shown 
that user innovation is widespread and growing in importance. 
  Qualitative observations have long indicated that producers have no monopoly on 
innovation. In his Wealth of Nations, Adam Smith (1776) pointed out the importance of 
'the invention of a  great number of  machines  which facilitate and abridge labor,  and 
enable one man to do the work of many'. He went on to note that 'a great part of the 
machines made use of in those manufactures in which labor is most subdivided, were 
originally the invention of common workmen, who, being each of them employed in 
some very simple operation, naturally turned their thoughts towards finding out easier 
and readier methods of performing it'.  
   Early empirical  user innovation  studies  were  concerned  with  specific  product 
types.  Von  Hippel  (1976)  identified  a  high  ratio  of  user  to  producer  innovation  in  a 
sample of the most important innovations in scientific instruments in the past 20-30 years. 
Other examples include medical equipment (von Hippel and Finkelstein, 1979) and sports 
equipment (Shah, 2000). Alternatively, researchers have identified the proportion of user 
populations engaging in innovation affecting specific product categories. These types of 
study begin by identifying a population of users that are interested in a specific type of 
product, then each firm or individual in the sample is asked whether it has developed an 
innovation in the field at issue in order to use it. These studies generally find that 10 to 40 
percent of user populations are innovators (von Hippel, 2005). The phenomenon has been 
identified as substantial in printed circuit CAD software (Urban & von Hippel, 1988), 
pipe  hanger  hardware  (Herstatt  &  von  Hippel,  1992),  library  information  systems 
(Morrison et al., 2000), surgical equipment (Lüthje, 2003), Apache OS server software 
security features (Franke & von Hippel, 2003), outdoor consumer products (Lüthje, 2004), 
extreme sporting equipment (Franke & Shah, 2003), mountain biking equipment (Lüthje 
et al., 2002) and banking services (Oliveira & von Hippel, 2009). 
  Until  recently,  empirical  evidence  could  be  not  considered  representative  for 
larger populations. Recent work however shows that user innovation is very common in 
broad samples of firms, and, even more striking, that also substantial numbers of end 
consumers are user innovators. See Table 2. 
 
Table 2. Frequency of user innovators in broad samples of firms and end consumers 
Source  Country  Year  Sample  Frequency 
Arundel & Sonntag (1999)  Canada  1998  4200 manufacturing plants with > 20 
employees and $ 250K revenues 
48% 
Schaan & Uhrbach (2009)  Canada  2007  6478 manufacturing plants with > 20 
employees and $ 250K revenues 
43% 
de Jong & von Hippel 
(2009) 
Netherlands  2007  498 high-tech small firms (1-100 
employees) 
54% 
de Jong & von Hippel 
(2008) 
Netherlands  2008  2416 small firms (1-100 employees)  21% 
Flowers et al. (2009)  United 
Kingdom 
2009  1004 small- and medium-sized firms 
(10-250 employees) 
15% 
Flowers et al. (2009)  United 
Kingdom 
2009  2106 individual end consumers > 15 
of age 
8% 
   12 
So far, three countries have been at the leading edge of surveying user innovation. An 
early study identifying user innovation in a broad sample was written up by Arundel and 
Sonntag  (1999).  As  part  of  their  survey  of  Advanced  Manufacturing  Technologies, 
Statistics Canada sampled thousands of Canadian manufacturing plants with at least 20 
employees and $ 250 000 revenues. Amongst other questions, data were collected on the 
adoption, modification and development of specific technologies. A key finding was that 
48 percent of the surveyed plants either modified existing technologies, or developed 
their  own  technologies  to  apply  in  their  operations.  More  recently,  this  survey  was 
updated by Schaan and Uhrbach (2009). They found that 43 percent of the surveyed 
manufacturing plants were user innovators.  
  In the Netherlands, researchers have examined user innovation in small firms, i.e. 
with 1 to 100 employees. These studies sampled individual small business owners to ask 
if they had developed innovations for internal use. In a sample of 498 high-tech firms, de 
Jong and von Hippel (2009) found that 54% had somehow engaged in user innovation in 
the past three years. Another sample focused on small firms in all (for profit) industries, 
and found that 21% of the small firm population is a user innovator (de Jong and von 
Hippel, 2008).  
  In the United Kingdom, this finding has recently been reproduced for a sample of 
firms with 10 to 250 employees from all industries. Here, it was estimated that 15% of 
the UK business population is a user innovator (Flowers et al., 2009). Moreover, in this 
study a first attempt was done to map user innovation by individual end consumers. Since 
it  has  generally  been  assumed  that  'consumers  just  consume'  products  and  services, 
incumbent statistical indicators do not capture innovation by consumers at all. Findings 
from  an  omnibus  survey  of  2109  individuals,  after  conservative  adjustment  for  false 
positives, show that in the past three years 8% of the UK consumers (aged > 15) created 
or modified one or more of the consumer products they used, in order to make something 
better suited to their needs than products available on the market.  
  A common finding is that the frequency of user innovation is contingent on size 
(larger organizations are more process-intensive which calls for in-house innovation) and 
technical capability (for this reason a high share of user innovation was found in Dutch 
high-tech  firms).  In  samples  of  end  consumers  the  share  of  innovators  is  obviously 
smaller, but still reflecting millions of innovating individuals (Flowers et al., 2009).  
  In all, survey evidence shows that user innovation is found everywhere. Moreover, 
it is likely that user innovation will become more dominant in the near future – a process 
that has been emerging already in the past ten years. This shift is being driven by new 
technologies, specifically the transition to increasingly digitized and modularized design 
and production practices, coupled with the availability of very low-cost, Internet-based 
communication (Baldwin & von Hippel, 2009). These largely exogenous developments 
steadily increase the scope and richness of innovations that user innovators can design 
and develop, either on their own or in communities. They will be increasingly able to 
routinely apply sophisticated design tools (software) and computing power to innovate at 
costs that are trivial relative to comparable costs in the past.  
2.4 User-centered model 
Users innovate at the leading edge of emerging needs for new products and services, 
where markets by definition are both small and uncertain. Empirical research shows that   13 
users tend to be the dominant source of innovation with respect to functionally novel 
innovations,  and  that  the  frequency  of  user  innovation  in  samples  of  firms  and  end 
consumers is substantial.  The  following  user-centered  model  of innovation  traces the 
pathway  from  the  initial  development  of  a  new  product  by  users  through  to 
commercialization by producers (Figure 2).  
         
Figure 2. User-centered, alternative model of innovation 















User innovation begins when one or more users of some good recognizing a new set of 
needs  and/or  design  possibilities  and  begin  to  design  and  build  and  use  innovations 
intended to better serve their own needs. If the innovation is of interest to additional 
users, one or more communities of user-innovators soon coalesce and begin to exchange 
information  about  their  various  designs,  their  experiences  with  them,  and  promising 
avenues for improvement.  
  Next, some time after user innovation begins, the first user-purchasers appear – 
these are users who want to buy the goods that embody the lead user innovations rather 
than building them for themselves. Some of the user innovators may decide to start their 
own  businesses  to  satisfy  other  users'  similar  needs.  The  first  producers  to  enter  the 
market are likely to be user-founded firms, i.e. user-innovators who draw on the same 
flexible, high-variable-cost, low-capital production technologies they use to build their 
own prototypes.  
  As information about product designs becomes codified, and as market volumes 
grow,  incumbent  producers  -  both  existing  user-founded  firms,  established  producers 
from other fields, and start-up producers who have identified the opportunity - can justify 
investing in higher-volume production processes involving higher capital investments. 
These processes have lower variable costs, hence their use will tend to drive prices lower 
and  expand  the  market.  User-purchasers  then  have  a  choice  between  lower-cost 
standardized goods and higher-cost, more advanced models that user-innovators continue 
to develop. User innovators will be present throughout the emerging industry's life cycle, 
because (established) producers will only serve homogenous target markets, so that at 
least  some  users  will  not  precisely  get  what  they  want.  Throughout  the  life  cycle 
however, the role of producers versus users as a source of innovation will slightly change 
–  user  innovators  will  be  most  dominant  in  the  nascent  and  early  stages  of  industry 
emergence.   14 
  The user-centered model provides an alternative view of how innovation 'works'. 
Clearly,  many  innovations  developed  today  are  no  result  of  a  research-development-
production-diffusion  model.  As  we  discussed,  the  user-centered  model  has  been 
consistently  documented  in  many  cases  and  surveys,  suggesting  that  the  producer-
centered model adequately describes innovation in (at best) only part of the real-world 
cases.  
3. Legitimacy 
This  section  is  concerned  with  the  legitimacy  of  policies  for  user  innovation.  In  a 
neoclassical economic view, markets should be allowed to do their work of achieving 
optimal allocative efficiency. In policymaking it has accordingly been accepted that any 
intervention should be refrained from unless one has good reasons to do so. Common 
arguments  for  policy  include  the  occurrence  of  spillovers  (so  that  the  social  welfare 
effects of policy interventions exceed those of its direct beneficiaries) and failures. We 
will subsequently discuss why user innovation is marked by substantial spillovers, but 
also hampered by specific market and system failures disabling the user-centered model 
to reach its full potential. 
3.1 Spillovers 
A key argument to legitimize innovation policy is that eventually, everybody will benefit 
from it. Because of spillovers the social benefits of innovation exceed those of individual, 
innovating actors. These imply that not just the beneficiaries of innovation policies are 
advanced, but also external actors who do not invest or innovate at all.  
  Spillovers  may  relate  to  knowledge-, network-  and  rental effects  (Jaffe,  1996; 
Griliches, 1992). Knowledge spillovers appear when knowledge that is developed by one 
actor becomes available to others, for example due to workforce mobility, publications, 
informal contacts or the reverse engineering of products. Such knowledge may inspire 
and enable others to initiate and implement more innovations. Network spillovers imply 
that  technologies,  which  are  developed  in  separate  contexts,  are  complementary.  An 
example is computer hardware and software which would be pretty useless without each 
other. Hence, producers see their potential revenues increase because of complementary 
innovative  products,  and  users  may  see  their  utility  improve  due  to  better  and  more 
specific  offerings.  Finally,  rental spillovers  relate  to improved  price-quality  ratios  for 
users.  Product  innovation  for  example  improves  the  quality  of  products,  while  the 
innovator  will  usually  not  manage  to  raise  his  prices  to  fully  appropriate  the  rise  in 
quality.  
  In the producer-centered model spillovers are achieved by selling new products to 
users, but also by spillovers which are involuntary from the producer's point of view. In 
the user-centered model, mechanisms of diffusion are quite different. If user innovations 
would not be diffused, multiple users with very similar needs would invest to (re)develop 
very similar innovations, which would be a poor use of resources from a social welfare 
point of view. Previous work however provides two arguments why user innovations are 
very  likely  to  be  diffused.  First,  users  tend  to  develop  innovations  which  are  very 
attractive to others. Second, users tend to voluntarily reveal their innovations to others,   15 
implying  that  diffusion  is  implicit,  and  maybe  even  more  likely  than  in  the  case  of 
producer innovation.  
  As  for  the  argument  of  attractiveness,  we  recall  from  section  2.2  that  users 
possess different knowledge and develop different innovations than producers do. Users 
have a more accurate and detailed model of their needs than manufacturers have. They 
are more likely to develop innovations with new functionality. In contrast, manufacturers 
tend to develop improvements on well-known needs that require a rich understanding of 
solution information for their development (von Hippel, 2005). Thus, user innovators are 
anticipated to engage in radical innovations, while producers are more likely to develop 
incremental improvements to existing product lines, and this is what empirical studies 
suggest (e.g., Morrison et al., 2004). We also discussed that innovating users are most 
significant in the nascent and emerging stages of industries. Since they operate at the 
leading edge of markets, the novel products they develop for their own use are likely to 
be appealing to other users, and also to producers who may want to commercialize them 
(von  Hippel,  2005).  Indeed,  lead  user innovators  appear  to develop  new  or  modified 
products with high commercial value (Morrison et al., 2004; Franke & von Hippel, 2003). 
The more generally useful their innovations, the more likely they will be adopted by 
producers to be commercialized (de Jong & von Hippel, 2009).  
  As for revealing, we recall that new and modified products developed by users 
often diffuse widely—and they do this by unexpected means: user-innovators themselves 
often  voluntarily  reveal  to  others  what  they  have  developed  to  examine,  imitate,  or 
modify without any payment to the innovator. Free revealing implies that user innovators 
voluntarily give up their potential intellectual property rights and share the details of their 
innovation  with  anyone  interested,  so  that  the  information  becomes  a  public  good 
(Harhoff et al., 2003). The practices visible in open-source software development were 
important in bringing this phenomenon to general awareness. In these projects it was 
clear policy that project contributors would routinely and systematically  freely  reveal 
code they had developed at private expense (Raymond, 1999). However, free revealing 
has been documented in many other cases. Even user enterprises appear to reveal their 
innovations. In a survey of Dutch high-tech small firms, de Jong and von Hippel (2009) 
found that many user innovators do not mind if others take notice of their innovations, 
and most of them would allow strong ties in their networks to inspect and benefit from 
them. Likewise, in earlier work free revealing has been documented in more specific 
samples  including  the  iron  industry  (Allen,  1983),  mine  pumping  engines  (Nuvolari, 
2004),  medical  equipment  (von  Hippel  &  Finkelstein,  1979),  semiconductor  process 
equipment  (Lim, 2000),  library  information  systems  (Morrison et al.,  2000),  sporting 
equipment (Franke and Shah, 2003) and embedded Linux software (Henkel, 2003). Users 
who freely reveal what they have done often find that others then improve or suggest 
improvements to the innovation, to mutual benefit (Raymond, 1999). Freely revealing 
users also may benefit from enhancement of reputation or positive network effects due to 
increased diffusion of their innovation (Lakhani & Wolf, 2005).  
  Due  to  their  attractiveness  and  users'  tendency  to  reveal,  empirical  surveys 
consistently find that user innovations diffuse to others. In a survey of Dutch high-tech 
small firms, de Jong and von Hippel (2009) found that one out of four innovations was 
adopted by producer firms. This was usually without any charge or, at best, an informal 
type of compensation (such as promises of reductions on future orders). Identical results   16 
were obtained in surveys of Canadian manufacturing plants (Gault & von Hippel, 2009) 
and small- and medium-sized firms and individual end consumers in the United Kingdom 
(Flowers  et  al.,  2009).  In  sum,  user  innovation  is  marked  by  voluntary  spillovers  of 
highly attractive innovations.  
3.2 Market failure 
The argument of market failure stems directly from neoclassical economic theory, which 
considers  markets  as  preferable  mechanisms  to  achieve  optimal  allocative  efficiency. 
Policy incentives should stress competition, and aim to reduce barriers to entry, growth 
and  exit  of  enterprises.  Market  failure  is  said  to  be  present  when  markets  result  in 
suboptimal outcomes, i.e. enterprises under-invest in innovative activities which results 
in a welfare loss (Arrow, 1962; Nelson, 1959).  
  Traditionally, theorists distinguish between four types of market failure, including 
1. lack of appropriability, 2. uncertainty, 3. indivisibility and 4. asymmetric information 
(Gustafsson & Autio, 2006; Hauknes & Nordgren, 1999; Chaminade & Edquist, 2006). 
Each type will be elaborated on next. In advance, we remark that the producer-centered 
model  is  dominant  in  our  thinking  of  market  failures.  Innovators are  supposed  to  be 
triggered by economic incentives, and to benefit from innovations by trading them with 
other economic agents. However, users innovate primarily for themselves - market trade 
is  far  from  a  necessary  condition.  This  implies  that  some  market  failures  are  not 
applicable to innovating users, but others do as we discuss hereafter. 
  First, lack of appropriation implies that actors are unable to fully appropriate the 
(market related) benefits from innovation (Chaminade & Edquist, 2006). In the words of 
Teece  (1986:  p.  285):  'It  is  quite  common  for  innovators  –  those  who  are  first  to 
commercialize  a  new  product  or  process  in  the  market  –  to  lament  the  fact  that 
competitors/imitators have profited more than the one first to commercialize it'. In the 
producer-centered  model,  this  is  regarded  as  a  serious  disincentive,  and  to  legitimize 
policies like intellectual property rights and R&D subsidies in order to actually reduce 
spillovers ('to stimulate spillovers we should give economic actors the institutional tools 
to reduce spillovers'). As we already discussed, user innovators are not concerned with 
appropriation too much. The empirical work so far has shows that user innovators think 
of spillovers as an opportunity, not a threat. In the early work of Allen (1983) it was 
argued that free revealing could be economically justified on several grounds, including 
(i) reputation gains, (ii) many people knew the information that it could not have been 
kept secret in any case, (iii) the innovation is to some extent specific to the innovator and 
so free riders would not gain advantage equal to that of the innovator, (iv) gains in the 
value  of  assets  complementary  to  the  use  or  production  of  the  innovation,  (v)  free 
revealing  may  increase  the  innovator's  profit  by  enlarging  the  overall  market.  More 
recently, it was documented for high-tech small firms that if there was any compensation, 
this was usually in terms of informal agreements with strong network ties (de Jong & von 
Hippel, 2009). In fact, intellectual property rights seem to disadvantage users as they may 
hamper the modification or creation of new products (see section 3.3.). 
  Second, uncertainty usually refers to producers' inability to know in advance what 
innovation  will  bring  them  (Chaminade  &  Edquist,  2006).  It  is  quite  common  for 
innovations to fail as a result of technical problems or consumers' unwillingness to buy. 
Producers are in general reluctant to invest in innovation even if the expected value of   17 
their investments is slightly positive but uncertain. In contradiction, for users the issue of 
uncertainty  is  less  problematic.  Adoption  by  consumers  is implicit,  so  only  technical 
uncertainty remains. Like producers, users do not know in advance if their solutions will 
work. As discussed, they have superior need information, but are disadvantaged in terms 
of  solution  information  (von  Hippel,  1994).  This  creates  opportunities  for  policies  to 
better connect individual users or to involve producers as partners in innovation processes. 
In section 4, these matters will be elaborated upon. 
  Third, indivisibility traditionally relates to the fact that producer innovation can be 
pretty demanding in terms of monetary investments, and may require substantial initial 
investment  to  build  and  maintain  a  stock  of  knowledge  required  for  innovation 
(Chaminade  &  Edquist,  2006).  In  the  user-centered  model,  unlike  appropriation  and 
uncertainty, indivisibility can hamper innovation at least as much. The producer-centered 
model already recognizes that indivisibility is most problematic in small organizations. 
For individual users, it has been argued that if innovation design costs get too high, single 
user innovators are unable to innovate unless they  manage to organize themselves in 
networks  (Baldwin  &  von  Hippel,  2009).  In  case  of  low-cost  innovations  or 
modifications of existing products that are justifiable based solely on the in-house use of 
a  single  innovator,  users  can  well  innovate  for  themselves.  But  when  innovation 
expenditures  get  bigger,  problems  of  investment  coordination  among  users  enter  in. 
Compare, for example, a mountain bike and a full-fledged personal computer operating 
system. Individual users may be well able to develop and build their own bikes, but full-
fledged  operating  systems  may  require  too  much.  In  this  context,  Benkler  (2006) 
introduced the concept of 'granularity' to refer to the size of the modules, in terms of the 
time and effort that an individual must invest in producing them. As he notices: 'If the 
finest-grained  contributions  [to  an  innovation  project]  are  relatively  large  and  would 
require  a  large  investment  of  time  and  effort,  the  universe  of  potential  contributors 
decreases'(p.100-101).  Hydrogen  driven  car  engines  for  example  would  require  an 
infrastructure to fill up, which is difficult for users to organize. This implies that at least 
some goods that users could afford are hampered by indivisibility. In such cases, policies 
to stimulate concerted efforts (as evidenced in many historical examples, but also in more 
recent cases like open-source software) or even financial incentives for user innovations 
may be legitimate. 
  Fourth, asymmetric information may hamper user innovation too. In the producer-
centered  model  it  implies  that  the  distribution  of  innovation  resources  in  society  is 
inadequate.  As  a  consequence,  valuable  innovation  projects  are  not  implemented. 
Producers may for example find it hard to persuade investors of the potential of their 
ideas, or fail to recruit technical staff in order to innovate (Chaminade & Edquist, 2006). 
For  users,  asymmetric  information  refers  to  the  sticky  information  argument  that  we 
discussed in section 2. Users possess abundant need information, but are disadvantaged in 
terms of solution information. They may need producers' services in order to innovate, 
but qualitative evidence suggests that producers can be reluctant to recognize the value of 
user innovations (e.g., de Jong & von Hippel, 2009). Moreover, producers with solution 
information can be needed to effectively distribute innovations. In the case of information 
products, users have the possibility of largely or completely doing without the services of 
producers.  In  physical  product  fields,  the  situation  is  different.  Users  can  develop 
products,  but  the  economies  of  scale  associated  with  manufacturing  and  distributing   18 
physical  products  give  producers  an  advantage  over  'do-it-yourself'  users  in  those 
activities (von Hippel, 2005).  
  In summary, incumbent thinking of  market failures seems partly  applicable to 
justify policies for user innovation. Especially indivisibility and asymmetric information 
may prevent the user-centered innovation model to grow to its full potential. 
3.3 System failure 
In a world of producer-centered innovation, the literature on innovation systems provides 
more arguments to justify policy intervention (e.g., Tsipouri et al., 2008). In comparison 
with market failures, the systems literature assumes that under-investment in innovation 
is  not  exclusively  due  to  poorly  functioning  markets,  but  can  also  be  influenced  by 
hampering factors in the 'innovation system', defined as 'all important economic, social, 
political, organizational, institutional and other factors that influence the development, 
diffusion and use of innovations' (Edquist, 1997).  
  The systems literature (e.g., Nelson, 1987; Lundvall, 1992; Freeman, 1995) has a 
different view on how innovations come into being. Rather than a linear process it is 
proposed that innovation is the result of complex and intensive interactions between end 
users, enterprises, knowledge suppliers  and intermediary parties (Arnold &  Kuhlman, 
2001). This process is influenced by infrastructural arrangements (such as the availability 
of  finance,  standards  and  legislations)  and  other  external  conditions  including 
entrepreneurship and labor mobility. A graphical presentation of a national innovation 
system is given in Figure 3. 
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The systems view implies that economic growth and social well-being are founded on 
well-functioning innovation systems, in which all actors need to perform. Both nodes and 
flows  are  important  in  innovation  systems,  since  knowledge  diffusion  and  spillover 
processes, combined with excellent absorptive and learning capacities among actors in 
the  system,  are  key  aspects  of  such  systems.  With  the  realization  that  knowledge 
producers  may  also  be  users,  and  vice  versa,  the  idea  of  analytically  partitioning 
knowledge-related activities into supply and a demand sides breaks down (O'Doherty & 
Arnold, 2003). Thus, the systems view deviates from the linear, producer-centered model 
of innovation, and accordingly provides better opportunities to justify policies in support 
of user innovation.  
  Producer-oriented  theorists  have  identified  four  main  types  of  failure  which 
constitute crucial obstacles to the functioning of innovation systems: 1. capability failure, 
2. network failure, 3. institutional failure and 4. framework failure (e.g., O'Doherty & 
Arnold,  2003; Gustafson &  Autio,  2006;  Tsipouri  et al.,  2008).  In what  follows,  we 
explain that each of these failures can be anticipated to constrain user-centered innovation 
as well. 
  First,  capability  failures  refer  to  the  'nodes'  of  the  innovation  system.  Crucial 
actors  in  the  innovation  system  may  be  weakly  developed  in  terms  of  innovation 
capabilities. Producers can for example lack a sense of urgency or have poorly developed 
absorptive  capacities.  Similar  issues  are  likely  also  hamper  user-centered  innovation. 
Users may not manage to innovate due to lack of technical skills or inability to devote 
time and other resources. Previous work shows that user innovators tend to have technical 
capabilities – a finding documented in case studies of scientific instruments (von Hippel, 
1976), pipe hanger hardware (Herstatt & von Hippel, 1992), semiconductor processes 
(von Hippel, 1988) and oil refining (Enos, 1962). A survey in the Netherlands showed 
that high-tech small firms, being better equipped to develop their own innovations, were 
about 2.5 times more likely to be user innovators than regular small firms (de Jong & von 
Hippel, 2008). We also know from case studies that many more users have innovative 
ideas for what they want than have the capabilities to develop them – for example in 
mountain biking (Lüthje et al., 2002) and library information systems (Morrison et al., 
2000). Thus, policies to further develop users' innovation capabilities would be legitimate. 
  Second,  network  failures  bear  on  the  'flows'  of  the  innovation  system. 
Relationships  between  actors  are  not  self-evident  and  may  need  to  be  triggered  and 
supported (Gustafson & Autio, 2006). Users need to be able to connect with each other, 
and with relevant producers, for support and other assistance to develop innovations, and 
also for effective diffusion of their innovations. Von Hippel (2005) discusses a model in 
which multiple users may end up developing the same thing independently, concluding 
that it is more efficient to collaborate. In practice however, not all user innovators have 
the ability to connect. Survey evidence of high-tech small firms suggests that most users 
collaborate and share with their close network ties only (de Jong & von Hippel, 2008), a 
finding that was replicated for UK user firms (Flowers et al., 2009). Such network failure 
can  be  addressed  by  (online)  horizontal  user  innovation  communities  which  are 
nowadays  seen  in  open-source  projects.  Horizontal  networks  of  users  would  enable 
effective development of innovations by many individuals. In the case of information 
products this is anticipated to work nicely, but for physical products, producers would 
still be necessary because economies of scale are often involved in the production of   20 
copies of the physical innovation (von Hippel, 2007). In such instances, again, network 
failure will diminish the development and diffusion of user innovations. 
  Third, institutional failure relates to a disability to (re)configure institutions so 
that they work effectively within the innovation system. Institutions are 'sets of common 
habits, norms, routines, established practices, rules or laws that regulate the relations and 
interactions between individuals, groups and organizations' (Edquist & Johnson, 1997). 
Examples of important institutions are intellectual property rights, as well as rules and 
norms  influencing  the  relations  between  enterprises  and  consumers.  Especially 
intellectual property rights (IPRs) seem important for the user-centered model to work 
well.  It  has  been  argued  that  patent  laws  and  other  IPRs,  while  designed  to  allow 
innovating producers to protect and benefit from their innovations, actually hamper users 
in their ability to modify and create new products – as they may infringe on producers' 
patents while innovating (Strandburg, 2008).  
  Fourth, framework failure implies that effective innovation depends partly upon 
regulatory  frameworks,  health  and  safety  rules,  etc.  as  well  as  'other  background 
conditions, such as the sophistication of consumer demand, culture and social values' 
(Edquist & Johnson, 1997). One striking framework failure that would justify policies for 
user  innovation  is  in  fact  the  dominant  logic  of  current  policy  makers  to  focus  on 
producer-centered  innovation.  All  current  innovation  policies  are  tailor-made  for 
organizations that benefit from selling innovations, rather than using them. This includes 
matters like IPRs, but also the requirement that projects supportable with government 
funds often require R&D expenditures. User innovation projects are often not organized 
or budgeted for in this fashion, as evidence shows for Canadian manufacturing plants 
(Gault & von Hippel, 2009) and Dutch high-tech small firms (de Jong & von Hippel, 
2009). 
  We conclude that drawing on traditional notions, policies for user innovation can 
be justified. The user-centered model is marked by spillovers, which are unlike producer-
centered innovation on a voluntary basis. The alternative paradigm also fits nicely with 
the innovation systems literature, as past work makes it plausible that user innovation is 
hampered  by  capability,  network,  institutional  and  framework  failures.  Even  market 
failure theory, being designed to support the producer-centered model, provides a basis to 
justify  policies  for  user  innovation.  Previous  work  clearly  suggests  that  users  find 
themselves constrained by indivisibility of (at least some) innovation expenditures and 
asymmetric information. Finally, a clear contradiction between both paradigms is seen in 
intellectual  property  rights,  which  are  supposedly  desirable  in  the  producer-centered 
model, but a potential constraint for user-centered innovation. 
4. Implications for policy 
Despite scientific criticism today's innovation policies are dominated by  interventions 
derived  from  the  producer-centered,  linear  model  (Godin,  2006).  Indeed,  developed 
countries focus on support for R&D cooperation, public-private partnerships, long-term 
research  agendas,  direct  support  for  business  R&D,  support  for  innovative  start-ups, 
knowledge transfer and support for public research organizations. Other, related policies 
focus on relieving barriers to producer innovation by providing innovation management 
and related advisory services, risk capital, and by addressing human capital – including   21 
the mobility of researchers, skilled personnel in enterprises, and career development of 
researchers (Tsipouri et al., 2008). 
  Researchers have only recently started to think of what user innovation implies 
for policy – so in advance we stress that it is important to start experiments to test the 
directions  discussed  hereafter.  We  will  first  present  two  general  principles  of  user 
innovation policies. Next, seven directions for policymaking are discussed, including to 1. 
Stimulate networking and collaboration between users, 2. Facilitate the adoption of user 
innovations  by  producers,  3.  Facilitate  modular  designs  of  innovations,  4.  Improve 
individuals'  technical  skills,  5.  Rethink  intellectual  property  rights,  6.  Explore  a  next 
generation  of  financial  incentives  and  7.  Improve  the  measurement  of  innovation  in 
official statistics. 
4.1 General principles 
In  order  to  account  for  user  innovation,  it  is  first  and  foremost  important  that 
policymakers  see  through  their  dominant  logic  of  what  effective  innovation  policies 
should look like. Another general principle is that user innovation policies need to be 
eligible  for  individuals  rather  than  just  organizations.  Both  principles  depart  from 
incumbent policy makers' dominant logic as we will now elaborate on.  
  After dozens of talks in multiple countries, and attending various seminars with 
policy makers, we learned that those who hear about user innovation for the first time 
find it hard to capture its implications. A usual response is that 'users are a valuable 
source of innovation ideas for producers, but we already knew that'. Slightly better is 'we 
should make producers aware that users are not just a source of ideas, but rather some of 
them  are  capable  of  doing  much  more'  or  'we  need  policy  interventions  to  support 
enterprises to benefit from user-driven innovation'. From the perspective of the producer-
centered model these responses make sense. Since it is generally assumed that consumers 
just consume, it may be hard to accept that policies can also directly target users. We 
however recall that there is consistent empirical evidence of widespread creation and 
diffusion of products by users themselves. Innovation by users is not the same as 'co-
creation' processes in which users and producers work together in product development. 
Nor is it a form of 'user-driven' innovation in which producers pay close attention to user 
needs while developing new products for them.  
  The user-centered model of innovation is easily misinterpreted. An illustrative 
example is provided by the Danish Ministry of Economics and Business Affairs, who 
initiated as grant scheme for 'user-driven innovation' in 2007. They reserved an annual 
budget of 13 million euros advertised as 'A special program for user-driven innovation … 
allowing to build knowledge of customers and citizens. The program aims to contribute 
to  achieving  the  goal  of  making  Danish  companies  and  public  institutions  more 
innovative. To obtain grants … projects must include and examine user needs in news 
ways.  User-driven  innovation  is  seen  a  way  to  [innovate]  based  on  a  systematic 
examination and inclusion of users' perceived and non-perceived needs. An improved 
knowledge of these needs can enable companies … to better target their R&D'
5. 
  Only  organizations  in  the  private  and  public  sector  are  eligible  for  funding. 
Although the Danish intervention was inspired by user innovation theory, apparently the 
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dominant  logic  of  the  producer-centered  model  took  over  when  it  was  designed  and 
implemented.  What remains is a traditional, producer-centered grant scheme to better 
account for the needs of users, which in practice turns out to be policy support for the 
application of mostly traditional marketing research methods. Such policies may be well 
received by Danish enterprises, but not in line with the user-centered innovation model.  
  A  second  restrictive  element  in  incumbent  policymaking  is  that  usually  only 
organizations  are  eligible  for  funding  or  support.  Again,  this  makes  sense  from  the 
producer-centered point of view. Producers, it is argued, are motivated to innovate by the 
expectation of profits. They eventually need to sell their innovations in order to benefit, 
so only commercial enterprises, self-employed and (in line with the linear model) public 
research organizations can be focal innovating actors. Such a view however ignores that 
user innovators can be any persons. Except for entrepreneurs, managers and individual 
inventors, they can be employees in non-R&D functions and individual end consumers. 
Policies  for  user  innovation  should  not  be  eligible  to  firms  only,  but  also  to  end 
consumers  who  may  engage  in  open-source  projects  or  individual  innovative  efforts 
while working from their very houses. Especially this latter element is a giant step from 
the incumbent policy makers' point of view.  
  We  argue  that  the  policy  mix  should  be  neutral  in  its  intended  effects  on 
producers and users, rather than being advantageous on producers at the expense of users. 
In the next sections we present some guidelines that will be helpful to bring balance to 
the current policy mix – but in advance we stress that any attempt will be useless, unless 
the  nature  of  the  user-centered  model  and  the  necessity  to  account  for  individuals' 
behavior, are understood and accepted.  
4.2 User networking and collaboration  
A first direction for policy is to stimulate networking and collaboration between users. 
Innovation by users tends to be widely distributed rather than concentrated among just a 
very few very innovative users (von Hippel, 2007). As a result, it is important for user-
innovators  to  find  ways  to  combine  and leverage  their  efforts. Users  achieve  this  by 
engaging  in  many  forms  of  cooperation.  Direct,  informal  user-to-user  cooperation 
(assisting  others  to  innovate,  answering  questions,  and  so  on)  is  common.  Organized 
cooperation is also common, with users joining together in networks and communities 
that provide useful structures and tools for their interactions. 
  Networking  and  collaboration  is  also  needed  to  effectively  diffuse  innovative 
products to other users. Producers partially achieve diffusion by selling their products 
(partially, because they diffuse the product incorporating the innovation, but often not all 
the information that others would need to understand it fully and replicate it). If user-
innovators do not somehow also diffuse their innovations, multiple users with similar 
needs have to develop similar innovations independently (von Hippel, 2005). 
  Government actions to assist networking and collaboration include ensuring that 
widely-distributed potential innovation contributors have low-cost access to each other 
and to problems of interest to them being worked upon by others. Currently, the Internet 
already provides an infrastructure for many users to collaborate (Lakhani & Wolf, 2005) - 
consider open-source projects like Apache and commercial providers like Innocentive. 
To further stimulate this, policy makers should favor free Internet access, or low-cost 
access for those who currently lack it. Moreover, support for open standards and open   23 
interfaces is merited, so that participants in collaborative projects can innovate with the 
fullest  information and  the  fewest  interface  constraints possible,  and  stimulate  online 
facilities where users can post relevant need and solution information (von Hippel & Jin, 
2009). 
  In  the  case of  physical  products,  online  collaboration  is  probably  not  enough. 
Although  users  can  share  and  distribute  product  designs  on  the  Web,  joint  problem 
solving usually demands physical presence in order to share sticky solution information. 
An example is the RepRap, an open-source 3D printer which can build any part (designed 
with  a  CAD  software  program)  in  layers  of  plastic.  Many  RepRap  enthusiasts  find 
themselves  challenged  by  putting  their  machine  together  and  to  get  it  in  operation. 
Although the RepRap community is quite successful in sharing and distributing codified 
knowledge on the Web
6, initial empirical evidence suggests that small communities in 
geographically  concentrated  regions  are  also  needed,  so  that  users  can  transfer  tacit 
knowledge on how to start it up - a phenomenon that is missing in open-source software. 
To  support  geographically  concentrated  networks  and  collaborations,  intermediary 
organizations  may  be  helpful.  Most  developed  countries  nowadays  finance  public 
intermediary  organizations  to  develop  firms'  innovation  capabilities  and  to  stimulate 
innovation networking (Howells, 2006). Examples include Syntens in the Netherlands, 
IWT in Belgium and Scottish Enterprise's Business Gateway
7. Such organizations should 
refrain from being the main architect of networks and collaborations, but rather facilitate 
their self-organization.  
4.3 Producer adoption 
A second direction for policy is to facilitate the adoption of user innovations by producers. 
This would address information asymmetries that hamper the diffusion of innovations 
developed by users. In the case of information products, users have the possibility of 
largely or completely doing without the services of producers – the Web allows them to 
create, produce and diffuse complex products by and for themselves in the context of user 
innovation communities. In physical product fields however, the situation is different. 
Users can develop products, but scale economies give producers an advantage over 'do-it-
yourself' users in production and distribution (von Hippel, 2007).  
  It is far from self-evident that producers adopt users' innovations. Most of today's 
producers still think that their job is to find a need and fill it rather than to sometimes find 
and commercialize an innovation that lead users have already developed. Accordingly, 
producers  have  set  up  market-research  departments  to  explore  user  needs,  and  NPD 
teams to think up suitable products to address those needs. In this type of innovation 
environment, the needs and prototype solutions of lead users are typically rejected as 
outliers of no interest. Indeed, when lead users' innovations do enter a firm's product line 
they typically arrive with a lag and by an unconventional and unsystematic route. For 
example, a producer may 'discover' a lead user innovation only when the innovating user 
firm contacts the producer with a proposal to produce its design in volume to supply its 
own in-house needs (von Hippel, 2005).  
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  We propose that policy makers could improve the interaction between users and 
producers along three lines. First, producers can be stimulated and taught to benefit from 
lead users. Second, producers can be supported to draw innovating users into joint design 
interactions  by  providing  them  with  toolkits.  Third,  users  can  become  entrepreneurs 
themselves  in  order  to  widely  diffuse  their  innovations.  We  discuss  each  of  these 
possibilities in turn. 
  Freely  revealed  innovative  activities  by  lead  users  offers  producers  useful 
information about user needs embodied in solutions. Empirical work has shown that most 
NPD projects are unsuccessful (e.g. Cooper, 2003). Given access to a user-developed 
prototype, producers longer need to understand users' needs very accurately. Instead they 
have the much easier task of replicating the function of user prototypes that users have 
already  demonstrated  are  responsive  to  their  needs.  For  policymaking,  informational 
campaigns on the potential value users in innovation processes – beyond market research 
and regarding users as a source of expressed needs only – may help to overcome such 
information asymmetries. Moreover, producers can be taught how to track lead users in 
their fields of interest. A natural experiment conducted at 3M for example showed that 
lead user product ideas and solutions generated more than 8 times the sales forecast for 
new products compared with traditional NPD projects (Lilien et al., 2002).  
  Producers  may  also  involve  innovating  users  in  their  innovation  processes  by 
offering  'toolkits  for  user  innovation'.  This  involves  partitioning  product-development 
projects  into  solution-information-intensive  subtasks  and  need-information-intensive 
subtasks. Need-intensive subtasks are then assigned to users along with a kit of tools that 
enable them to effectively execute the tasks assigned to them. In the case of physical 
products, the designs that users create using a toolkit are then transferred to producers for 
production (von Hippel & Katz, 2002). Empirical evidence shows that users' willingness 
to pay for self-designed products is much better (Franke & Piller, 2004). Most producers 
however seem reluctant to allow users to modify or tinker with their products. They may 
actually suppress user innovation by building technologies in their products that prevent 
any unintended use. For example, makers of ink-jet printers often follow a razor-and-
blade strategy, selling printers at low margins and the ink cartridges used in them at high 
margins.  To  preserve  this  strategy,  printer  manufacturers  want  to  prevent  users  from 
refilling ink cartridges with low-cost ink. Accordingly, they add technical modifications 
to  their  cartridges  to  prevent  them  from  being  refilled.  This  also  excludes  useful 
modifications,  i.e.  users  refilling  cartridges  with  special  inks  not  sold  by  printer 
manufacturers to enable printing very high-quality photographs (Varian, 2002). Policy 
makers can intervene with informational campaigns, advisory services and educational 
programs to build awareness and remove such constraints.  
  Last but not least, innovations developed by users usually achieve widespread 
diffusion when those users become producers themselves - setting up a firm to produce 
their innovative products for sale. Shah (2000) first showed this pattern in sporting goods 
fields. In the medical field, Lettl and Gemunden (2005) have shown a pattern in which 
innovating users take on many of the entrepreneurial functions needed to commercialize 
the new medical products they have developed, but do not themselves abandon their user 
roles. Shah and Tripsas (2007) show that, in at least one field (the multibillion dollar 
juvenile  products  industry),  60%  of  all  firms  in  the  industry  were  founded  by  user-
innovators. As we discussed in section 2, user entrepreneurship is seen most often in the   25 
early  stages  of  industry  emergence  while  incumbent  producers  enter  somewhat  later. 
However,  user  innovators  are  not  necessarily  equipped  with  great  entrepreneurial 
capabilities, and policy interventions in support of user entrepreneurs may be needed. 
Such  interventions would  include coaching  and  advisory  services on  how  to develop 
strategies, to bootstrap for external finance, to write a business plan, and more.  
4.4 Modular designs  
A third direction for policy is to facilitate modular designs of innovations. This would 
mainly address the failure of indivisibility of innovation objects, as discussed in section 
3.2. In a recent contribution, Baldwin and von Hippel (2009) explain that collaborative 
open innovation projects – for example, as seen in open-source software – have major 
advantages over projects carried out by producers, and also over single user innovators. 
Because each participant can contribute a small part, the design costs of each contributor 
can be relatively low. In principle, given that the overall design tasks can be subdivided 
into small modules, and given enough interested participants, a design project of any size 
can be undertaken, even far beyond the kind of innovations that producers can handle. 
However,  two  conditions  apply.  First,  communication  costs  are  a  major  issue  for 
collaborative  open  projects.  Collaborators  must  communicate  with  one  another  to 
coordinate  and  compile  their  efforts.  This  means  that  low  communications  costs,  as 
recently enabled by the internet, are critical to the viability of such distributed innovation 
– so for policymaking, internet access is again an important point of attention.  
  Second,  to  organize  the  distributed  effort,  but  still  coordinate  the  whole,  the 
project needs a modular structure. An innovation is said to have a modular design if its 
parts  can  be  developed  independently  but  will  work  together  to  support  the  whole. 
Modules are distinct parts of the larger system, which can be designed and implemented 
independently as long as they obey the design rules. Thus, modules are units in an overall 
system design that are 'powerfully connected within themselves and relatively weakly 
connected  to  other  units'  (Baldwin  &  Clark,  2006).  A  policy  issue  is  that  current 
knowledge of modular designing may need to be supported in education. In polytechnics 
and technical universities, quite a few of today's engineering students are still taught to 
design in traditional ways. There is certainly no harm in subsidizing projects to stimulate 
modular designing in education, so that future innovators in businesses are better able to 
design products in such a way that they can harvest the 'power of the crowds'. Likewise, 
at  least  some  end  consumers will  be provided  with  the  design  capabilities  needed  to 
potentially mobilize substantial numbers of co-developers.  
  With modular designs, there is no need to coordinate innovation time and money 
expenditures  if  each  module  provides  an  independent  benefit  worth  its  cost  to  the 
particular  user-innovator.  It  gets  to  be  a  problem  when  such  modularity  cannot  be 
achieved for some reason and takes a coordinated effort (for example, in the case of drugs 
or green technologies). Again, intermediary organizations may then have a role to play. 
Public investment in creating modularity in a specific field, for example investment in the 
development  of  specialized  equipment,  might  be  justifiable  to  reduce  or  eliminate 
problems with indivisibility in particular fields.    26 
4.5 Technical skills 
A fourth direction for policy is to improve individual citizens' technical skills. This helps 
to overcome capability failures of potential user innovators. As discussed in section 3, 
user innovators usually have technical capabilities, and there are more people having an 
idea for what they want than have the capabilities to implement them. Or in the words of 
Strandburg  (2008):  'User  innovation  is  not  ubiquitous,  of  course.  It  is  of  greatest 
importance where users have both sticky information about their needs and the technical 
capacity to make inventions that fulfill those needs' (p.481).  
From  the  user  point  of  view,  getting  the  capabilities  is  an  infrastructure 
investment with project-specific costs on top. In general, this invites policy makers to 
stimulate people's capabilities for innovation. We here suggest two potential courses of 
action.  First,  policy  should  focus  on  an  education  system  that  is  able  to  develop 
foundation analytical and problem-solving skills, creativity, imagination, resourcefulness 
and flexibility – education in technical specializations would be most important. This will 
support citizens' collective capacity to initiate, absorb, support, organize, manage and 
exploit innovation in its many forms. In this respect, it has already been identified that 
low  public  expenditures  on  scientific  and  engineering  education  is  potentially  very 
harmful (NESTA, 2006). Support for technical education at all levels, i.e. to attract large 
numbers  of  students,  including  primary,  secondary  and  tertiary  education,  is 
recommended. Besides, as populations age and the half-life of training shortens, policy 
makers will need to address post-graduate training and 'lifelong learning' of a society's 
human capital as well.  
Second, government actions to assist in capability development could include the 
development and diffusion of user-friendly computer-aided design tools that are central 
to collaborative innovation work conducted over the Internet (von Hippel & Jin, 2009). 
There is a lot of investment in toolkits that increasingly is sparing users from investment 
in general categories of infrastructural learning such as CAD-CAM tool training. It might 
be  reasonable  for  government  to  support  the  development  of  these  kinds  of  toolkits. 
Except for toolkits innovating users may also need access to specialized machinery for 
prototyping and initial production. Policy makers may initiate support programs in which 
users  can  access  specialized  machines  at  university  labs  or  large  commercial 
organizations, or alternatively, in community-operated physical spaces in which users 
sometimes manage to raise their own specialized equipment. Examples include the many 
FabLabs and Hackerspaces
8.  
4.6 Intellectual property rights  
A fifth direction for policy is to rethink intellectual property rights (IPRs). This issue is 
the very aspect of policymaking in which the producer- and user-centered models of 
innovation have conflicting interests, i.e. IPRs are introduced to relief producers' lack of 
appropriation, but from the perspective of users they represent an institutional failure.  
A  first remark  is  that many academics  nowadays agree that  producer-oriented 
IPRs often not have their intended effect. There are economies of scope in both patenting 
and copyright that allow firms to use it in ways that are directly opposed to the intent of 
policy makers and to the public welfare (Foray, 2004). Large firms are much better able 
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to patent their inventions and create 'patent thickets' - dense networks of patent claims 
that  give  them  plausible  grounds  for  threatening  to  sue  at  the  expense  of  weaker 
competitors (Shapiro, 2001; Bessen, 2003). Movie, publishing, and software firms can 
use large collections of copyrighted work to a similar purpose (Benkler, 2002). In view of 
the distributed nature of innovation by users, with each tending to create a relatively 
small  amount  of  intellectual  property,  users  are  as  likely  as  small  firms  to  be 
disadvantaged by such strategies. It is also important to note that users tend to build 
prototypes of their innovations economically by modifying products already available on 
the market to serve a new purpose. Laws such as the (U.S.) Digital Millennium Copyright 
Act, intended to prevent consumers from illegally copying protected works, also can have 
the  unintended  side  effect  of  preventing  users  from  modifying  products  that  they 
purchase (Varian, 2002).  
  In  order  to  make  innovation  policies  neutral  with  respect  to  the  sources  of 
innovation, governments could pursue two directions. An elegant approach would be to 
target users themselves. Suppose that many elect to contribute their intellectual property 
to a commons in a particular field. If the commons then grows to contain reasonable 
substitutes  for  much  of  the  proprietary  intellectual  property  relevant  to  the  field,  the 
relative advantage accruing to large holders of this information will diminish and perhaps 
even disappear. At the same time, the barriers that privately held stocks of intellectual 
property  currently  may  raise  to  further  intellectual  advance  will  also  diminish.  This 
possibility is supported by the creation and publication of standard Creative Commons 
licenses. However, reaching agreement on conditions for the formation of an intellectual 
commons can be difficult. Maurer (2006) makes this clear in his cautionary tale of the 
struggle and eventual failure to create a commons for data on human mutations. In such 
instances,  government  intervention  can  be  helpful  by  offering  intermediary  services 
(possibly  implemented  by  similar  organizations  as  mentioned  in  section  4.2).  Also, 
policymakers can add support of open licensing infrastructures to the tasks of existing 
intellectual property offices (Gault & von Hippel, 2009). 
A  more  complicated  direction  would  be  to  evaluate  and  redesign  the  current 
intellectual property regimes. Rather than continuously extending patent systems in terms 
of strength and enforcement, the user-centered model would benefit from a less stringent 
system. Strandburg (2008) recognizes that while innovating, users will often infringe on 
producers'  intellectual  property.  She  then  recommends  a  blanket  exemption  from 
infringement liability for research use (p. 468). This would also better enable users to 
modify patented products in ways not anticipated by their patent holder. Another source 
of inspiration for a 'balanced' patent doctrine can be derived from the current regimes of 
plant breeder's rights. From the initial establishment of patent acts in the United States 
and  in  Europe,  it  has  generally  been  felt  that  the  patent  system  is  inappropriate  for 
protecting  new  plants.  Consequently,  special  plant-tailored  protection  systems  were 
created (van Overwalle, 1999) - and still in operation today. These systems are marked by 
exemptions for research purposes and even breeding purposes.  
The research exemption implies that breeders can develop new varieties starting 
from existing (protected) varieties, but they  cannot commercialize their new varieties 
without the consent of the plant variety rights owner (van Overwalle, 1999). Generalizing 
such an exemption would enable users to build on and modify incumbent technologies, as 
long as they do not commercialize their findings (at least, not without asking permission   28 
and  negotiating  an  agreement  first).  Such  an  exemption  would  better  enable  users  to 
innovate  without  being  compromised  by  patent  protection.  The  diffusion  of  user 
innovations may however still be limited – at least user entrepreneurs may be hindered by 
negotiations with patent holders.  
The breeder's exemption is even broader, as it allows breeders to develop a new 
variety  starting  for  an  existing  (protected)  variety  and  commercialize  it  without  the 
consent  of  the  plant  rights  owner.  Such  a  patent  would  definitely  empower  users  to 
diffuse  their  innovations  by  means  of  new  ventures,  but  we  are  aware  that  such 
exemptions are unlikely to be achieved in the policy arena. In sum, the plant variety 
rights system offers producers a weaker protection than the current patent doctrines, as it 
not only allows for research exemptions, but also for breeder's exemptions. Such a system 
would  better  account  for  'infringement'  acts  done  privately  and  for  non-commercial 
purposes, and enable the rapid diffusion of user-developed innovations. 
4.7 Financial incentives 
A sixth direction for policy is to explore a next generation of financial incentives for 
innovation. Canadian evidence shows that lack of funds was one of two obstacles to (user) 
innovation most frequently identified as having high importance (Schaan & Uhrbach, 
2009). This study also showed that most user firms do not finance their innovations from 
an R&D or formal innovation budget – implying that such expenditures are probably 
missed by current innovation subsidies. Indeed, recent survey evidence of user innovation 
by UK firms shows that only 6 percent of all user innovations was supported by some 
kind of public grant scheme or R&D tax credit (Flowers et al., 2009). At the same time, 
as we discussed in the previous sections, users often offer voluntary spillovers of their 
innovation-related knowledge that they have developed at their private expense, while 
their benefits are obtained from in-house use only. Some form of financial incentive for 
user-innovators  might  therefore  be  justifiable  based  upon  similar  reasoning  used  for 
producer-innovators.  Such  incentives  will  be  cost-effective  because  potential  user 
innovators are likely constrained by uncertainty about the technical feasibility or lack of 
modularity of innovations, but not by lack of appropriation or market uncertainty issues 
(as we discussed in section 3.2). We do not expect that user innovation incentives will 
require enormous policy budgets. 
In terms of design, financial incentives would clearly differ from those offered in 
the producer-centered model. User innovations are developed more closely to the market. 
This implies that traditional grants or tax credits will not work as they potentially disturb 
market  processes.  We  here  propose  four  design  elements.  First,  in  the  case  of  user-
innovators, financial support must be linked to a requirement to freely reveal information 
sufficient to enable others to practice the same innovation – perhaps in the form of an 
'anti-patent' that both proves novelty of claims and provides the information needed for 
others 'ordinarily skilled in the art' to practice the innovation that has  been revealed. 
Alternatively,  the  innovation  could  be  contributed  to  a  commons  or  at  least  broadly 
presented so that any adopter cannot apply for a patent. Second, policies should account 
for the fact that most users innovate because they are intrinsically motivated to do so. 
Policies can account for this by offering recognition and fame, for example via awards 
and open competitions – note that free revealing is implicit for such types of incentives. 
Prizes and competitions are an elegant way of reducing the risk of unwillingness to reveal   29 
and  abuse  public  funds in general.  Third,  financial  incentives  need to  be eligible  for 
individuals  too.  Financial  incentives  will  be  more  neutral  by  being  available  to 
individuals (including employees in organizations and individual end consumers) and by 
not being limited to fundamental research projects.  
Finally, governments could even institute tax credits or grant schemes analogous 
to those found in the producer-centered model, for innovators that freely reveal well-
documented results of their private innovation developments. We are aware that such 
schemes are directly opposed to the dominant logic in current policymaking, but as long 
as all innovation results are revealed, serious harm is unlikely. Grant schemes could be 
organized  as  'collective  contracts'  in  which  multiple  users  commit  themselves  to  a 
distributed effort.  A  scheme that  already  comes  close is the  'Innovation  Performance 
Contracts' currently offered in the Netherlands. It is a grant scheme in which groups of 
(15-35)  firms,  usually  from  the  same  industry,  agree  to  collectively  invest  time  and 
resources  in  innovation
9 .  In  practice,  most  collaborations  focus  on  user  process 
innovations because competing firms do not like to collaborate on product innovation. 
One example is the development of lightweight boats to reduce fuel consumption by 
inland marine transport firms. If this scheme would become eligible for individuals and 
require to  publicly  reveal all results,  it  may  be effective  to  support open, distributed 
innovations even when user participation is constrained by lack of modularity.  
4.8 Measurement 
A final direction for policy is to improve the measurement of innovation to reflect the 
user-centered model (von Hippel & Jin 2009, Gault & von Hippel 2009). User innovation 
is currently no part of official government statistics. The main international sources of 
indicators are the CIS (OECD, 2005) and R&D surveys (OECD, 2002). Both sources take 
the  perspective  of  the  linear,  producer-oriented  model.  In  this  context,  Jensen  and 
colleagues (2007) conclude that in the EU's annual ranking of innovation performance of 
member  states  only  traditional,  linear  innovation  indicators  are  used,  such  as  R&D 
expenditures,  patenting,  and  the  share  of  the  population  with  tertiary  education. 
According  to  Godin  (2006)  current  measurement  practices  are  the  major  reason  that 
policy  makers  implicitly  still  favor  the  sequence  of  basic  research,  applied  research, 
development  and  diffusion.  It  has  therefore  been  proposed  that  current  measurement 
practices need modification (e.g., Jensen et al., 2007; Godin, 2006; Laestadius, 1998).  
We here suggest that official statistics should be modified in such a way that both 
producer and user innovation are adequately captured (in line with NESTA, 2006; Von 
Hippel & Jin, 2009). Until the actual levels of user innovation and expenditures are made 
clear,  it  will  be  difficult  to  get  governments  to  take  the  policymaking  needs  of  user 
innovators seriously.  
Some  might  argue  that  user  innovation  indicators  overlap  with  traditional 
indicators which are already part of the basic surveys, including process innovation. This 
however proves not to be the case (de Jong & von Hippel, 2008). The Oslo Manual - 
which guides statistical offices in collecting and interpreting innovation data with CIS 
surveys - defines process innovation as 'the implementation of a new or significantly 
improved production or delivery method. This includes significant changes in techniques, 
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equipment and/or software' (OECD, 2005: paragraph 163). It is not required to actually 
develop  or  modify  any  product,  and  indeed,  user  and  traditional  process  innovation 
indicators do not show a strong overlap (de Jong & von Hippel, 2008). One other set of 
questions included offers a list of possible information sources ranging from 'clients' to 
suppliers to government labs, and asks respondents to rate the importance of inputs from 
each to their development efforts their innovation projects (OECD, 2005). Invariably the 
client  (user)  is  ranked  as  supplying  very  important  information  by  most  producers. 
However, the problem with this question from the point of view of documenting the 
innovation role of users is threefold: the nature of the innovation remains uncovered, the 
terms of transfer are unclear, and the survey is directed to producers only, so we are only 
able to learn, even with improved questions, about innovations that users revealed to 
producers, and about user-producer transactions from producers' point of view.  
Researchers have now begun develop and test new methods for collecting data on 
user  innovation  more  accurately.  Empirical  surveys  have  been  done  to  measure  user 
innovation among samples of firms in Canada (Schaan & Uhrbach, 2009; Gault & Von 
Hippel, 2009), the Netherlands (De Jong & Von Hippel, 2008; 2009) and the United 
Kingdom  (Flowers  et  al.,  2009).  The  latter  study  was  also  first  to  document  user 
innovation in  broad  samples  of  end  consumers. In  general, survey  results  shows  that 
among small firms, the share of user innovators typically is 15-20%. For end consumers 
8% was classified as a user innovator (Flowers et al., 2009). Another consistent result is 
that one out of four innovations developed by users is adopted by other users or producer 
firms. It is important to follow-up on the work that has been done so far.  
5. Discussion 
In  this  section  we  summarize  our  conclusions  regarding  the  user-centered  model  of 
innovation.  Next,  we  elaborate  on  its  policy  implications  and  give  some  further 
recommendations. 
5.1 Conclusions 
The dominant logic in today's innovation policy is one of producer-centered innovation. 
Policy makers assume that innovation is the province of producers, who can be either 
commercial enterprises or public research organizations. This may still seem a reasonable 
view, as producers are generally believed to effectively serve many users and to benefit 
from selling multiple copies of a single innovative design. However, the emergence of 
user innovation – and its open, distributed forms like open-source software in particular – 
is hard to reconcile with this traditional view. We therefore presented an alternative view 
of how innovation occurs, i.e. the user-centered model.  
  User innovators can be either firms or individual consumers that expect to benefit 
from using an innovative product. In contrast, traditional producer innovators expect to 
benefit from selling an innovative product. Thus, in order to profit, producers must sell or 
license knowledge  related  to  innovations,  or  products  incorporating  their  innovations. 
User-centered innovation processes are very different from the traditional, manufacturer-
centered model, in which products and services are developed in a closed way, with the 
manufacturers using patents, copyrights and other protections to prevent imitators from 
getting a free ride on their innovation investments. In the manufacturer-centered model, a   31 
user's only role is to have needs, which manufacturers then identify and fill by designing 
and producing new products. Users that innovate can develop exactly what they want, 
rather than relying on manufacturers to act as their (often imperfect) agents. Moreover, 
individual users do not have to develop everything they need on their own: they can 
benefit from innovations developed and freely shared by others.  
  Under  the  user-centered  model,  economically  important  innovations  are 
developed by users and other agents who divide up the tasks and costs of innovation 
development and then freely reveal their results. Users obtain direct use benefits from the 
collaborative  effort.  Other  participants  obtain  diverse  benefits  such  as  enjoyment, 
learning, reputation, or an increased demand for complementary goods and services. As it 
appears,  users innovate  at  the leading edge  of  emerging needs  for  new  products  and 
services, where markets by definition are both small and uncertain. Producers enter the 
market much later when a sufficient number of users has adopted the innovation, so that 
the presence of a homogenous group of consumers is given. The first producers to enter 
the market are likely to be user-founded firms, i.e. user-innovators who draw on the same 
flexible, high-variable-cost, low-capital production technologies they use to build their 
own prototypes.  
  A common finding in empirical research is that the frequency of user innovation 
is significant. Even individual end consumers have been found to innovate –a survey in 
the UK indicates that 8% of all consumers engages in user innovation. As for commercial 
enterprises, the share of user innovators varies from 15% (in a broad sample of UK small 
firms) to about 50% (in samples of Canadian manufacturing plants and Dutch high-tech 
small firms) (Flowers et al., 2009; De Jong & Von Hippel, 2009; Schaan & Uhrbach, 
2009). We also anticipate that the user-centered model of innovation will be increasingly 
seen in the near future. This is due to two fundamental and undeniable trends: a. steadily 
improving design capabilities of users, made possible by increasingly sophisticated and 
affordable computer hardware and software, and b. improving ability of individual users 
to combine and coordinate their innovation-related efforts via new communication media 
such as the Internet (Von Hippel, 2005).  
  Policies  for  user  innovation  are  legitimate  for  similar  reasons  as  under  the 
producer-centered model. In the user-centered model spillovers of knowledge are given, 
because  most  users  do  not  mind  to  reveal  their  innovations  to  others.  Besides,  user 
innovation is likely to be constrained by capability, network, institutional and framework 
failures.  Even  market  failure  theory,  being  designed to  support  the producer-centered 
model,  provides  a  basis  to  justify  policies  for  innovation  by  users.  Previous  work 
suggests  that  users  find  themselves  constrained  by  indivisibility  of  (at  least  some) 
innovation  expenditures,  and  by  asymmetric  information,  keeping  producers  from 
assisting them in the development and diffusion of innovations.  
5.2 Recommendations 
The ongoing shift of innovation to users has some very attractive qualities. It is becoming 
progressively easier for many users to get precisely what they want by designing it for 
themselves.  Innovation  by  users  also  provides  a  very  necessary  complement  to  and 
feedstock for manufacturer innovation. In this context, Henkel and von Hippel (2005) 
concluded that innovation by users increases social welfare. They found that, relative to a 
world in which only producers innovate, social welfare is increased by the presence of   32 
innovations freely revealed by users. Users tend to develop new functionality which they 
require themselves. Producers can study these early user innovations to gain information 
about both emerging market needs and possible solutions that would be difficult to obtain 
otherwise. They can then advance the users' work by turning it into a robust product, 
producible at low cost. User innovation thus helps to reduce information asymmetries and 
increase efficiency of the innovation process. It can enable producers to provide a higher 
fraction of new products that are marketplace successes (Henkel & von Hippel, 2005). 
Thus, both models are complementary to each other. Product innovations developed by 
users will tend to fill small niches of high need left open by commercial sellers. User 
innovations are more likely to be different types of innovation, marked by functional 
novelty and better appeal to other users. And user innovation is characteristic for nascent 
and emerging industries.  
  Governments  should  balance  the  current  policy  mix  by  developing  and 
implementing  policies  that  account  better  for  open,  distributed  and  user-centered 
innovation. In order to adapt policies, we argued that two general principles need to be 
taken into account. First, it is important that policymakers see through their dominant 
logic  of  what  effective  innovation  policies  look  like.  The  user-centered  model  is 
dissimilar from 'user-driven' forms of innovation in which producers pay close attention 
to user needs while developing new products for them. Second, user innovation policies 
need to be eligible for individuals, and not just organizations.  
  Next,  in  order  to  overcome  the  specific  market  and  system  failures  that  we 
identified,  seven  directions  for  policymaking  need  to  be  further  explored.  It  is 
recommended to 1. Stimulate networking and collaboration between users, 2. Facilitate 
the  adoption  of  user  innovations  by  producers,  3.  Facilitate  modular  designs  of 
innovations,  4.  Improve  individuals'  technical  skills,  5.  Rethink  intellectual  property 
rights,  6.  Explore  a  next  generation  of  financial  incentives  and  7.  Improve  the 
measurement of innovation in official statistics. 
  We  are  aware  that  adopting  these  issues  is  a  giant  step  from  the  incumbent 
policies' point of view. It is however urgent because the anticipated and ongoing shift of 
product development activities to users can potentially wipe out incumbent producers. 
Open, distributed innovation is 'attacking' a major structure of the social division of labor. 
Many firms and industries must make fundamental changes to long-held business models 
in order to adapt – and policy support is needed to guide this too. On the other hand, we 
anticipate that as soon as the idea of user-centered innovation is accepted, new policy 
instruments  can  be  implemented  relatively  easily.  As  far  as  financial  incentives  are 
involved, we anticipate that they will not be expensive – small amounts of money to 
overcome  problems  with  indivisibility  should  do  most  of  the  job.  Presumably  the 
workings of the intellectual property (IP) system need most concern. This is the only 
aspect  of  current  policymaking  in  which  both  models  of  innovation  have  direct 
conflicting interests. 
  We  remark  that  researchers  have  only  recently  begun  to  explore  the  policy 
implications  of  open,  distributed,  user-centered  innovation.  Additional  work  on  their 
legitimacy and effectiveness is called for. We recommend further work in three directions. 
First, as we discussed in section 4.8, the measurement of user innovation, and especially 
how it is reflected in official statistics, needs improvement. Current indicators need to be 
further developed and tested in bigger samples and in official government surveys like   33 
the CIS. Second, we need to know much more about what hampers user innovation, and 
what parameters policy makers need to focus on so that the user-centered model can 
reach its full potential. The kind of bottlenecks that (potential) user innovators encounter 
is an uncharted area of research. We expect that drawing on such a study more directions 
for policymaking can be formulated, in addition to the ones discussed here. Third, we 
recommend to start with policy experiments on a smaller scale to identify under what 
design conditions various interventions are effective. New indicators may also serve to 
test the effectiveness of new policy measures to support user innovation.  
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